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INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING SECURITY AND
COMMUNITY STABILITY
For many decades, economists and planners have debated the
value of rent control, staking out opposing sides of the debate with
results that are mixed.1 For the most part, the literature adopts a
conventional approach to assessing the effectiveness of rent
stabilization ordinances, asking, for a particular city with rent control,
how many renters are protected and affordable units preserved, and

1. See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating et al., Conclusion, in 204 RENT CONTROL:
REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 205–06 (W. Dennis Keating et al.
eds., 1998); MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., USC DORNSIFE PROGRAM FOR ENVTL. & REG’L
EQUITY, RENT MATTERS: WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF RENT STABILIZATION
MEASURES?
1,
4
(2018),
https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Rent_Matters_PERE_Report_Final_02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PB94-67PK].
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whether the ordinance dampened housing production.2
The
conclusion is usually that there are some winners (typically long-term
residents) and some losers (particularly low-income newcomers).3
Yet, it is entirely possible that impacts of rent stabilization vary by
neighborhood. Neighborhoods differ in terms of their mix of housing
and their trajectories of change.
Some are homogeneous
communities of single-family homeowners, untouched by rent
stabilization. Others have a mix of building and tenure types — for
example, apartment buildings with renter occupants may act as a
more flexible housing supply. Some are high-income and exclusive,
gradually losing their low-income residents without replacement.
Others are low-income and gentrifying with new affluent residents.
Still other low-income areas are simply churning low-income
residents. These differing contexts offer varying degrees of stability
and security for their residents.
In a diverse, rapidly changing low-income neighborhood, rent
stabilization may cause fewer residents to move out, intensifying
competition and increasing rents for the few housing units available.4
In an exclusive neighborhood populated primarily by affluent
residents, rent-stabilized units play a similar role in terms of slowing
exit rates, but without creating the same kind of pressure on the other
units. Given high land costs in these areas, these units also may
become the only feasible way of preserving affordability. At the same
time, there may be pressure to convert housing units, whether in
single-family homes or apartment buildings, from rental to
homeowner tenures.
Neighborhood dynamics also vary depending on regional context.
Rent stabilization ordinances are enacted city by city, likely resulting
in spillover effects in neighboring municipalities. For instance, to the
extent that stabilization reduces churn, and thus housing supply,
adjacent communities may experience a surge in demand — and
prices.5 This may then result in conversion from homeowner to rental

2. See Andrejs Skaburskis & Michael B. Teitz, The Economics of Rent
Regulation, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET

41, 42–43 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998).
3. See generally W. Dennis Keating, Rent Control: Its Origins, History, and
Controversies, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET
1, 12 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998).
4. Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants,
Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 24181, 2019).
5. While to our knowledge, no study to date has examined spillover effects
between municipalities, a study of Cambridge, Massachusetts did find spillover
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units, or simply an increase in exclusion as low-income in-movers are
priced out.
This Article shifts the analytic lens from examining the
effectiveness of rent stabilization ordinances at preserving
affordability and supply to surveying how they work in different
neighborhood contexts throughout a diverse region — the 31-county
New York metropolitan region and its 20 million residents. The
analysis provided in this Article develops a typology of neighborhood
change, using United States Census data, that demonstrates the
extent to which low-income households are being displaced from both
low-income and moderate-to-high income neighborhoods. It then
couples this typology with estimations of the potential number of
rental units that would be affected by rent regulation. This Article
finds that over 1.2 million units could potentially be protected; about
three-quarters of these are currently affordable at the regional
median household income.6 The majority of the neighborhoods
potentially most affected by rent regulation are low-income (i.e. those
with a median household income of less than 80% of the regional
median).7
Most of these neighborhoods are either currently
undergoing processes of gentrification, displacement, or both; or have
vulnerabilities that place them at risk of such change.8
By analyzing how rent control works across a variety of
neighborhood types, from gentrifying to exclusionary and from
majority renter to homeowner, this Article provides a new
perspective on how renter protections maintain stable and secure
communities. Whether or not rent stabilization ordinances work to
preserve affordability, they may play an important role in helping
low-income residents achieve other goals, such as upward mobility or
a sense of community, while also supporting cities in their goals for
local diversity, inclusion, and fair housing.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the literature on
neighborhood change, with a focus on the various forms of
neighborhood ascent, from gentrification to exclusion.9 Part II

effects within the city. Property values increased in previously unstabilized buildings
upon the repeal of rent regulation. David H. Autor et al., Housing Market Spillovers:
Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts 661, 710 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18125, 2014).
6. See infra Table 3.
7. See infra Table 3.
8. See infra Figure 1.
9. See Ann Owens, Neighborhoods on the Rise: A Typology of Neighborhoods
Experiencing Socioeconomic Ascent, 11 CITY & COMMUNITY 345, 346 (2012).
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examines the variation in types of tenure across neighborhoods.
After a brief discussion of the methodological approach to analyzing
census data, Part III constructs typologies of neighborhood change
across the 31-county New York metropolitan region10 and examines
how they relate to the location of renter households. Part IV
examines how rent stabilization preserves affordability across
different neighborhood types. Finally, the conclusion offers thoughts
for further research and implications for policy.
I. UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE
Part I.A begins with an overview of theories and evidence about
neighborhood change across a variety of communities: from cities to
suburbs, and from low-income to high-income to mixed-income
communities. Part I.B then discusses different policies that have been
implemented to stabilize neighborhoods, such as fair share housing,
inclusionary zoning, and rent stabilization. It concludes with an
examination of existing literature on how these policies, including
rent regulations, perform in different neighborhood types.
A. Theories and Evidence on Neighborhood Change
Understandings of neighborhood change have developed over
time. The invasion-succession model of the Chicago school has long
dominated scholarship about neighborhood change — it describes a
process by which lower-income residents residing in the inner core of
the city invade the outer rings and gradually succeed the higherincome residents.11 Theorized during a period of rapid growth in the
city of Chicago, this model describes an influx of immigrants or
increase in incomes that will spur the succession process.12 New
competition for land causes shifts in concentric rings or zones, with
residents sorting themselves by socioeconomic status into
neighborhoods.13 With the Chicago core increasingly occupied by

10. The 31-county region includes the five boroughs of New York City (Bronx,
Kings, Manhattan, Queens, and Richmond), counties in Connecticut (Fairfield,
Litchfield, and New Haven), New Jersey (Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon,
Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, and
Union), and New York (Dutchess, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk,
Sullivan, Ulster, Warren, and Westchester).
11. See Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a
Research Project, in THE CITY 47, 50–51 (Ellsworth Faris et al. eds., 1925).
12. See Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a
Research Project, in THE CITY 47, 54–56 (Morris Janowitz ed., 1967).
13. Id. at 56–57.
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high-end
commercial
uses,
developers
constructed
new
neighborhoods on the periphery, attracting higher-income residents
ready to leave their aging properties in the urban core.14 Just as they
began to provide a lower quality of shelter, these housing units
filtered down to lower-income groups, who often overcrowded into
the units and hastened their decline.15
Whether or not through invasion-succession, the majority of
metropolises end up in a pattern of concentric rings or zones: the
innermost ring occupied by the commercial and residential renters
able to pay the most, subsequent rings occupied by households of a
mix of incomes, and the most affluent households occupying the
outermost ring.16 Pockets of concentrated poverty remain and, in
some regions, have increased.17 However, the diversity of many
neighborhoods in the urban core is increasing, perhaps due to
neighborhood ascent.18 Somewhere between 14% and 20% of
neighborhoods actually ascend in socioeconomic status each decade,
and though the majority of these are white suburbs, diverse minority
and immigrant core neighborhoods are increasingly likely to see
higher incomes as well.19 Some of this change is due to upgrading by
incumbent residents.20 Another reason for this change is best
characterized as gentrification, a form of revitalization that is
depicted by both an influx of new investment and an inflow of new

14. See HOMER HOYT, U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH
RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 82 (1939),
http://archive.org/details/structuregrowtho00unitrich
[https://perma.cc/TJK6KWGX].
15. See id. at 122.
16. See Rachel E. Dwyer, Poverty, Prosperity, and Place: The Shape of Class
Segregation in the Age of Extremes, 57 SOC. PROBS. 114, 125 (2010).
17. PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, THE CENTURY FOUND. & RUTGERS CTR. FOR URBAN
RESEARCH & EDUC., CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
CHANGES IN PREVALENCE, COMPOSITION, AND LOCATION OF HIGH POVERTY
NEIGHBORHOODS
2
(2013),
https://productiontcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2013/12/18013623/Concentration_of_Poverty_in_the_New_
Millennium-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVT2-7TWV].
18. Owens, supra note 9, at 357. Owens defines ascent as “neighborhoods that
experience improving socioeconomic status (SES) regardless of socioeconomic
origin, outcome, or process, with gentrification only one type of change falling under
this umbrella.” Id. at 346.
19. Id. at 363.
20. See PHILLIP L. CLAY, NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL: MIDDLE-CLASS
RESETTLEMENT AND INCUMBENT UPGRADING IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 7
(1979) (defining incumbent upgrading as a process in which existing residents
improve the conditions of their housing unit, resulting in physical impacts without
socioeconomic changes).
OF
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people, typically of higher educational and income levels than the
original residents, into low-income neighborhoods.21
Neighborhood change in the suburbs has garnered relatively less
attention from scholars. Some have noted the rise of the polycentric
region, where cities on the edge of the traditional urban core contain
new concentrations of jobs surrounded by housing.22 This new
centering attracts new upper-income residents, resulting in suburban
neighborhood ascent or gentrification.23 Recent observers are likely
to note the decline of the inner-ring suburbs.24 However, instead of
zones of homogeneity, today’s inner-ring suburbs appear increasingly
diverse.25
Neighborhood change also occurs in affluent areas, which may
increasingly exclude low-income households as housing becomes
more expensive. Despite pockets of diversity, economic segregation
has generally increased since the 1970s, and is associated with
increased racial segregation.26 Increases are particularly pronounced
in more affluent neighborhoods. Between 1980 and 2010, the share of

21. KAREN CHAPPLE, PLANNING SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND REGIONS: TOWARDS
MORE EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 141 (2015).
22. See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 6–7 (1991);
Alex Anas et al., Urban Spatial Structure, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1426, 1427
(1998); E. Heikkila et al., What Happened to the CBD-Distance Gradient?: Land
Values in a Polycentric City, 21 ENV’T & PLAN. A 221, 221 (1989); Robert Lang &
Paul K. Knox, The New Metropolis: Rethinking Megalopolis, 43 REGIONAL STUD.
789, 792 (2009); Robert Lang & Jennifer LeFurgy, Boomburb “Buildout”: The
Future of Development in Large, Fast-Growing Suburbs, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 533,
533–34 (2007).
23. See Owens, supra note 9, at 357–58.
24. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN
POVERTY IN AMERICA 2 (reprt. ed. 2014); THOMAS J. VICINO, TRANSFORMING RACE
AND CLASS IN SUBURBIA: DECLINE IN METROPOLITAN BALTIMORE 4 (2008); John
Rennie Short et al., The Decline of Inner Suburbs: The New Suburban Gothic in the
United States, 1 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 641, 642 (2007).
25. Bernadette Hanlon et al., The New Metropolitan Reality in the U.S.:
Rethinking the Traditional Model, 43 URB. STUD. 2129, 2138 (2006); see KNEEBONE
& BERUBE, supra note 24, at 9.
26. See RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RES. CTR., THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION
BY
INCOME
4
(2012),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8fa9/5fbbdc4772c77947205e4606a358813f8bb5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL6G-EPSM]; Claude S. Fischer et al., Distinguishing the

Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–
2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 53–54 (2004); Paul A. Jargowsky, Take the Money and
Run: Economic Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 984, 991
(1996); Daniel T. Lichter et al., The Geography of Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and
Concentrated Poverty, 59 SOC. PROBLEMS 364, 378 (2012); Sean F. Reardon &
Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1092,

1139 (2011).
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upper-income households living in majority upper-income tracts
doubled from 9% to 18%, compared to an increase from 23% to 25%
in segregation of lower-income households living in majority lowerincome tracts.27
It is unclear what is happening to the low-income households in
these neighborhoods. One study of racially concentrated areas of
affluence suggested that these neighborhoods still retain substantial
shares of low-income households.28 Even as the concentration of
upper-income households was increasing in affluent areas, the
number of lower-income households was growing as well: the share of
lower-income households in majority upper-income tracts increased
from 1% in 1980 to 2% in 2010.29
The sorting of the rich and poor is even more pronounced between
jurisdictions than between neighborhoods in the same city.30 The
concentric zone model is strongly associated with the segregation of
the affluent.31 In other words, in metropolitan areas where the
affluent are most separated from the poor, the rich are living on land
further from the center — for instance in suburban enclaves.
Trajectories of neighborhood change are decidedly more varied
than early models predicted.32
There is a tendency towards
residential sorting and segregation, but at the same time, recent
decades have seen the emergence of ascending neighborhoods in the
urban core and diversifying inner-ring suburbs.33 Urban models
emphasize change but neighborhoods are actually quite slow to
change — neighborhoods are remarkably stable. This is in part
because Americans have become significantly more rooted over time.
In any given year, almost 90% of the residents lived in the same house
the year before.34 The annual mover rate for owner-occupied housing
is 5.1%, versus 24.9% for renters.35

27. FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 1.
28. See generally Edward G. Goetz et al., Racially Concentrated Areas of
Affluence: A Preliminary Investigation, 21 CITYSCAPE 99 (2019).
29. FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 13.
30. See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 26, at 1125.
31. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 129.
32. See ROBERT E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY 51–52 (Robert E. Park & Ernest W.
Burgess eds., 1967); Owens, supra note 9, at 363.
33. See Hanlon et al., supra note 25, at 2140.
34. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, About 36 Million Americans Moved in
the
Last
Year,
Census
Bureau
Reports
(Nov.
18,
2013),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-192.html
[https://perma.cc/9UX3-97QU].
35. Id.
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B. The Role of Policy
Neighborhood changes emerge in part from changing preferences,
but policies to support income-diverse or integrated neighborhoods
play a role as well.36 The public interest in supporting integration
stems from federal civil rights enforcement, particularly in the area of
fair housing.37 But substantial literature demonstrates the costs of
segregation and the benefits of income mixing.38 Underlying this
approach is the notion, advanced originally by New York urbanist
Jane Jacobs, that the mixture of household types, tenures, and
incomes that create income diversity are vital components of
neighborhood revitalization.39 Such an income mix can also serve to
break up or prevent concentrations of poverty that are viewed as
Good social services,
generators of neighborhood decline.40
especially education and safety, are easier to provide in communities
with more fiscal capacity to pay for such services.41 Everyone in the
community benefits from better services. Low-income families
benefit, just like middle-class families, when there are reductions in
crime rates, and their children benefit from access to higher quality
education.42
Mixed-income neighborhoods arguably create an environment
where the poor are not as segregated from the mainstream as they are
in neighborhoods with a concentration of poverty.43 Middle-income
residents bring resources that augment the quality of local schools,
parks, and other amenities, helping low-income residents to acquire
the skills needed to break away from poor communities, and thus
reducing social costs down the road.44 Income-diverse communities

36. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 119–24.
37. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR
HOUSING AND THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CITIES 93 (2018).
38. See James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, The New Imperative for Equality, in
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 26–27 (James H. Carr & Nandinee
K. Kutty eds., 2008); PETER DREIER ET AL., PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 62–96 (3d ed. 2014); George C. Galster, Polarization,
Race, and Place, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES, 216–17 (John C. Boger
& Judith W. Wegner eds., 1996).
39. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 148–51
(1961).
40. See Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of
Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 177 (L. E. Lynn & M. F. H. McGeary eds., 1990).
41. See DREIER ET AL., supra note 38, at 185.
42. See id. at 82, 96.
43. See id. at 284–86.
44. See id. at 287.
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may also be better equipped to avoid and withstand periods of decline
than low-income communities because of their diversity of housing
options and established economic base.45
A wide range of initiatives, from efforts by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to integrate subsidized
housing,46 to regional fair share housing,47 to inclusionary zoning,48
have been used to promote mixed-income communities. Assessments
indicate that these approaches have generally fallen short of their
implementation goals and, even when enacted, may not improve life
outcomes for the disadvantaged.49 One important precedent was the
Gautreaux lawsuits, starting in the late 1960s, which questioned the
legality of mobility programs that aimed to relocate public housing
residents to mixed-race and mixed-income neighborhoods.50 These
mobility programs operated under the premise that diversifying a
person’s environment would give access to advantages not available
in public housing, and adopted two approaches.51 The first, the
“development” strategy, attracts market-rate tenants to redeveloped
HUD-managed properties to create mixed-income communities.52
The HOPE VI program (running from 1992 to 2011), which
redeveloped public housing projects as new mixed-income
developments, grew out of this approach.53
In contrast, the
“dispersal” or “mobility” strategy grants tenants Section 8 vouchers
so that they could move into market-rate housing in the
neighborhood of their choice, provided that landlords would accept

45. See ALAN BERUBE, MIXED COMMUNITIES IN
ON EVIDENCE AND POLICY PROSPECTS 39–40 (2005).

ENGLAND: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See DRIER ET AL., supra note 38, at 159.
See id. at 262–63.
See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 82.
See id. at 239.
There were a number of Gautreaux decisions; in one of the first, Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, an Illinois federal district court found that the Chicago

Housing Authority discriminated based on race in the placement and leasing of
public housing. 269 F. Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969) aff’d 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.
1970). In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hills v. Gautreaux that remedial
mobility programs — court orders that provided Section 8 vouchers for public
housing residents to move to predominantly white neighborhoods to address CHA’s
discriminatory policies — were constitutional. 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976).
51. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 119.
52. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR
IN URBAN AMERICA 58 (2003).
53. CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 126. Over the duration of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI program, it made 515 grants, worth
over $6 billion, to replace about 83,000 housing units with a mixture of market-rate
and subsidized housing. Id.
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the voucher.54 This became the basis of the Moving to Opportunity
experiment, which was designed to relocate residents living in
neighborhoods with a concentration of poverty, as well as the eleven
consent decrees that followed the Gautreaux decision.55
Another set of initiatives have sought to promote the integration of
low-income housing into wealthier, high-opportunity neighborhoods.
These follow in part from the New Jersey case Southern Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, which called for municipalities
to provide their fair share of their region’s housing needs.56 Regional
fair share programs increase affordable housing opportunities
throughout a region, typically based on an allocation formula set by a
regional authority.57 Many municipalities have adopted inclusionary
zoning ordinances,58 but the number of affordable housing units
produced is quite small. In the 40 years of the program leading up to
2010, inclusionary zoning produced an average of about 4000 units
per year across the entire country.59
Rent stabilization ordinances may also act as a tool to promote
income mixing. Studies to date have not focused on this aspect of
rent regulations, but there exists some evidence that cities with rent
stabilization can preserve their income diversity and community
stability.60 Rent stabilization may spur gentrification, as landlords
seeking to profit in a hot market may try to remove their units from
regulation by evicting tenants and/or converting rental units to

54. See GOETZ, supra note 52, at 51.
55. See Susan J. Popkin et al., Obstacles to Desegregating Public Housing:
Lessons Learned from Implementing Eight Consent Decrees, J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 179, 179–99 (2003). The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program was
authorized in 1992 and was modeled after Gautreaux but differed in that it was
designed to relocate residents living in neighborhoods with a concentration of
poverty rather than racial concentrations. The program relocated residents living in
areas with greater than 40% of residents below the federal poverty level to areas
where less than 10% of the population was below the federal poverty level. For a
detailed description of all these programs, see GOETZ, supra note 52, at 45–63.
56. 456 A.2d 390, 478 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1983).
57. See Edward G. Goetz et al., The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the
Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31,
34–39 (2004).
58. Inclusionary zoning ordinances ask or require developers to provide a certain
proportion of affordable housing units within a development or provide funds in lieu.
See LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE HOUSING, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND LAND VALUE
RECAPTURE 1 (Nico Calavita & Alan Mallach eds., 2010).
59. For measurements and calculations, see id. at 15–78.
60. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
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condominiums.61 As supply tightens, local rents may increase. This
may still lead the remaining tenants to stay in place longer than they
would have (presumably due to reduced supply and improved local
amenities), stabilizing some communities.62
Residents of rent
stabilized apartments are 10–20% more likely to stay in their housing
long-term.63 Even when not facing drastically rising rents or market
pressures, benefits accrue to staying in a home longer. One study
found that tenants without rent regulations had a discount of 12.7–
21.7% for staying in their homes, and tenants in rent-stabilized units
had a discount of 26.5–30.9%.64
Affordability benefits of rent stabilization may even spill over for
units not in eligible buildings. Studies have found that rent
regulations are associated with either slightly decreased rents or no
effect on non-stabilized units.65 Cities with rent regulations in New
Jersey and California were found to have lower growth in median
rents than cities without regulations.66 In Massachusetts, rent
stabilized units were shown to slightly decrease rents of noncontrolled units.67
Moderate rent stabilization measures tend to exempt new
construction.68
Because of this, rent stabilization does not
significantly impact new construction, after controlling for related
characteristics.69 A study of New Jersey municipalities, with and
without rent stabilization measures, found that the measures did not
have a significant impact on appreciation or foreclosure rates, allaying
concerns about disinvestment in low-income areas.70 Other studies
demonstrate that in hot real estate markets, with wealthy incoming
tenants, tenant protections may generate increased demand for new

Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 2.
PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 4.
W. A. V. Clark & Allan D. Heskin, The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure
Discounts and Residential Mobility, 58 LAND ECON. 109, 111 (1982).
65. Edward L. Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?, 10 SWEDISH
ECON. POL’Y REV. 173, 197 (2003); David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We
Learn from the End of Massachusetts Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129, 148–49
(2007).
66. Glaeser, supra note 65, at 196.
67. Sims, supra note 65, at 148–49.
68. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
69. Id.; John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of
New Jersey Cities, 29 J. URB. AFF. 207, 214 (2007).
70. Joshua D. Ambrosius et al., Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New
Jersey’s Moderate Local Policies after the Great Recession, 49 CITIES: INT’L J. URB.
POL’Y & PLAN. 121, 131 (2015).
61.
62.
63.
64.
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construction. By protecting lower-income renters who stay in their
homes, wealthy tenants drive demand for, and are able to afford, new
construction.71
II. UNDERSTANDING HOUSING OPTIONS THROUGH A MORE
EXPANSIVE VIEW OF TENURE
Part II first defines housing tenure. It then examines the nature
and prevalence of different types of tenure in the New York
metropolitan region, detailing programs in New York City as well as
regulations in other jurisdictions. These different types of tenure
include informal tenures, affordability-protected rentals, open-market
rentals, third way tenures, homeownership, and mixed tenures.
Discussions of housing tenure, traditionally referring to the
arrangement of housing ownership and occupancy, are often viewed
in terms of a simple dichotomy of renting versus ownership.72 Tenure
can take a range of different forms, including mixed-tenure housing.73
Tenure offers a useful dimension for mapping the domain of housing
options, as moving beyond the original notion of tenure gives insight
into the amount of stability and control a resident has over their living
situation.74 Many forms of tenure are insecure, such as when renters
are not formally on the lease or where renters are unprotected from
potentially drastic rises in rents.75 Other forms of tenure carry
affordability protections, and there is a small but growing
development of “third way tenures,” involving cooperatives and

71. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 n.12 (citing the opinion of Berkeley
Housing Director Dr. Stephen Barton).
72. See generally Jake Wegmann et al., Breaking the Double Impasse: Securing
and Supporting Diverse Housing Tenures in the United States, 27 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 193 (2017); see also James Barlow & Simon Duncan, The Use and Abuse of
Housing Tenure, 3 HOUSING STUD. 219, 220 (1988) (describing and critiquing the
term in more depth).
73. See Barlow & Duncan, supra note 72, at 219 (describing tenure having more
than its original meaning of occupancy and homeownership); see also Wegmann et
al., supra note 72, at 10 (advocating for a more expansive definition of the range of
tenure types).
74. See ANNA CASH, U.C. BERKELEY, HOW IS OAKLAND LIVING? A TENURE
DIVERSITY
ANALYSIS
10
(2018),
http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/oakland_tenure_diversit
y_analysis_report_final_cash_051118.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHU5-H66D] (citing
Wegmann et al., supra note 72).
75. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72 (describing the concept of high-risk
tenures). This Article’s definition of “tenure” is based on Wegmann et al.’s
conception of high-risk tenures.
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community land trusts.76 Examples of each tenure type are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Forms of Tenure77
Form of Tenure

Examples

Informal tenures

Tenant not on lease; transitional
housing; living on street

Affordabilityprotected rentals

Rent controlled units; units under rent
stabilization measures; public housing

Open-market rentals

Rental units in municipalities that do
not have rent stabilization; units built
recently; single-family rental homes (in
most areas)

Third way tenures

Community land trusts; cooperatives

Homeownership

Owner-occupied homes

Mixed-tenure

Accessory Dwelling Units; rental units
in owner-occupied buildings

Central to conversations about housing and tenure is the question
of affordability: What housing is affordable, and to whom? Housing
can become insecure by not being affordable to a household. Both
owning and renting can include ranges of affordability, although
affordable housing is often assumed to refer only to rental housing.78
The classic reason for this distinction is the capital required for a
mortgage and the capital gains homeowners are able to accrue

76. Traditional “third sector” or “third way” housing was defined as common
property regimes, including cooperatives and community land trusts. CHARLES
GEISLER & GAIL DANEKER, PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP xiv (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
77. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 193–216 (describing concept of high-risk
tenure); see also CASH, supra note 74, at 23–28; supra note 75 and accompanying text.
78. John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It
More Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192 (2004).
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through property ownership.79 This then drives societal inequality.
For instance, historic redlining and racial discrimination in access to
mortgages and other loans resulted in the inability of people of color
to purchase property and attain the gains that white homeowners
were able to accrue, which contributes significantly to the racial
wealth gap.80 HUD estimates a rent to be affordable if it is less than
30% of a household’s annual gross income, and households paying
more than 50% of their income in rent are considered to be severely
rent burdened.81 Homeowners are also considered to be costburdened if they pay more than 30% of their income on housing costs,
including mortgages.82
A. Informal Tenures
Informal tenures encompass the most insecure forms of housing
and include those without a formal lease in a resident’s name or
without access to housing.83 The most vulnerable are those unhoused,
in shelters, or on the street.84 New York City has over 3000 street
homeless, and roughly 60,000 people living in shelters — the largest
population in the country.85
A wide range of other living
arrangements, often undercounted and unprotected, fall under this
umbrella as well, including short-term rentals, informal tenants,
transitional housing, and informal live-work arrangements.86 Other
forms of informal tenures include crowding, defined by the New York

79. Peter Saunders, Domestic Property and Social Class, 2 INT’L J. URB. &
REGIONAL RES. 233, 233–34 (1978).
80. Dalton Conley, Decomposing the Black-White Wealth Gap: The Role of
Parental Resources, Inheritance, and Investment Dynamics, 71 SOC. INQUIRY 39, 39
(2001).
81. NICOLE E. WATSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WORST CASE
HOUSING NEEDS 2017: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 2, 15 (2017).
82. MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN
AFFORD TO LIVE IN A HOME? A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
SURVEY
1
(2008),
https://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29YC-5RHD].
83. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
85. See Press Release, NYC Dep’t of Homeless Services, Survey Estimates Six
Percent Fewer Homeless New Yorkers on the Streets (June 19, 2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dhs/about/press-releases/hope-2018-results-release.page
[https://perma.cc/YDK8-5622]; Nikita Stewart, Long Nights with Little Sleep for
Homeless Families Seeking Shelter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/nyregion/long-nights-with-little-sleep-forhomeless-families-seeking-shelter.html [https://perma.cc/W5QN-9CCK].
86. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 24.
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City Housing and Vacancy Survey as more than one person per room
on average, for all rooms in a unit.87 In 2017, 11.5% of renter
households in the city were crowded under this definition.88
B. Affordability-Protected Rentals
The New York metropolitan region is home to a wide variety of
subsidized rental tenures, supported by federal, state, and city
subsidies as well as rent control and rent stabilization measures. The
term “affordability protection” is used in this Article to define
housing that has some legal regulation providing a constraint on the
rent, through direct subsidies or prohibiting a level of increase.89
Moreover, the term “protection” is used to encompass rent
stabilization and rent control, and retain focus on the impact on
residents. In the New York metropolitan region, affordability
protections are typically rental protections, though there are
affordable homeownership programs run by the city and state.90

i. Rent Stabilization and Rent Control
The most widespread affordability protections in the New York
metropolitan region are rent regulations.91 More than half of the
region’s rental units are located in New York City,92 but restrictions
in rent regulations mean that many of these units are exempt from
rent stabilization protections, due to high rents or being located in

87. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE
2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 8 (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initialfindings.pdf[https://perma.cc/FMF4-Z6PZ].
88. Id.
89. See Wegmann et al., supra note 72, at 20 (describing affordability
protections). Wegmann et al.’s description informs this Article’s definition of
“affordability protection.”
90. Opportunities for Homeowners and Homebuyers, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUSING
PRESERVATION & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/homeownershipopportunities.page [https://perma.cc/F7GV-V8YU] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019);
Affordable Housing Corporation, N.Y. ST. AFFORDABLE HOUSING CORP.,
https://hcr.ny.gov/affordable-housing-corporation-0
[https://perma.cc/B3NP-8SZ8]
(last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
91. See NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, RENT CONTROL BY STATE LAW
(2019),
https://www.nmhc.org/link/049fe4e913c24234b8d9fe0be2d6a40b.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JLR5-LDND]. However, this does not mean that half of rental units
in the region are covered, due to specifications of the rent stabilization laws.
92. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data, infra Part III.A.
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small buildings.93 In 2017, just 44% of New York City’s rental units
were rent stabilized.94 New York’s rent stabilization is maintained
through the Emergency Tenant Protection Act, which is renewed
every three years while the city is considered to be under a housing
emergency (with a vacancy rate below 5%).95 These units are
protected from open market increases on rents: as of 2018, increases
are allowed by the Rent Guidelines Board at the rate of 1.5% for oneyear leases and 2.5% for two-year leases.96 These regulations provide
stability: the median contract rent for rent stabilized units increased
by 2.6% from 2014 to 2017, while the median contract rent for private
non-regulated units increased by 10% in that time period.97
There are two primary limitations on rent stabilization in New
York City. First, rent stabilization most typically covers units in
buildings of six or more units built between February 1947 and
December 1973.98 There are a few additions, for buildings with
special affordability protections through tax exemption programs,99
certain buildings with three or more apartments constructed or
extensively renovated on or after January 1974 with special tax
benefits,100 and for tenants in buildings built before February 1947,
who moved in after June 1971.101 Second, New York City has
vacancy bonus increases and high-rent vacancy and high-income
decontrol thresholds. Vacancy bonus increases mean that each time a
tenant moves out, the landlord can raise the rent by 20% (for a twoyear lease, less for a one-year lease), with small additions for

93. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, RENT STABILIZATION
EMERGENCY TENANT PROTECTION ACT 1–2 (2019), https://hcr.ny.gov/rentstabilization-and-emergency-tenant-protection-act [https://perma.cc/X6JP-CHPN].
94. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., supra note 87, at 1.
95. See NYU FURMAN CTR., RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY 1–2
(2012).
96. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2018–19 APARTMENT & LOFT ORDER #50
(2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/rent-guidelines/2018-19apartment-loft-order-50.page [https://perma.cc/6CT4-6LNP].
97. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., supra note 87, at 21.
98. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, supra note 93.
99. See generally N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT
STABILIZATION
AND
RENT
CONTROL
(2018),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM].
100. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, supra note 93.
101. Id. These specific dates are due to the two waves of rent regulations passed in
New York City, the first due to migration during World War II, and the second
during inflation in the 1970s. See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent
Control?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 100–02 (1995).
AND
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improvements.102
High-rent vacancy decontrol means that
apartments are deregulated when rents rise beyond the current
deregulation threshold of $2774.76 and there is a vacancy.103 Highincome decontrol means that if the income of residents is above
$200,000 for each of the two prior years, and the rent of the unit is at
or above the deregulation threshold, the unit is no longer subject to
rent regulation.104
High rates of rent decontrol are the primary reason for a decline in
the number of rent-stabilized units in New York City. The Furman
Center found that approximately half of units in the city were rentregulated in 2011, with a net loss of 230,000 units over the past 30
years, despite the entry of units due to tax incentive programs.105 Due
to these decontrol measures, New York City has rapidly lost rentstabilized units: between 13,000 to 40,000 apartments are priced out of
rent regulation each year.106
Rent control, which is often conflated with rent stabilization, is
more restrictive. Rent control applies only to buildings constructed
before February 1947, with a tenant or a lawful successor — family
member, spouse, or adult lifetime partner — who has been living
continuously in the apartment since before July 1971.107 When rentcontrolled apartments become vacant, they either become stabilized,
if in an eligible building, or are removed from regulation.108 Rentcontrolled apartments only comprised approximately 1% of New
York City’s housing stock in 2017.109

102. See N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2018),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A].
103. RENT CONTROL, supra note 99, at 4.
104. Id.
105. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 95, at 2.
106. Cara Buckley, Deal Will Make It Harder to Use Renovation to Free
Apartments from Rent Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/nyregion/albany-deal-closes-rent-regulationloophole-for-landlords.html [https://perma.cc/8PRC-9NRC].
107. OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., TENANTS’ RIGHTS GUIDE 2,
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/tenants_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HWE-G8DT]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
108. Id.
109. N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE
2017 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 2 (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initial-findings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H36J-WG9L].
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Some other municipalities in the region have some form of rent
stabilization, sometimes through an Emergency Tenant Protection
Act similar to New York City, while other jurisdictions restrict
municipalities from adopting these protections.110 Those with highrent vacancy decontrol have similar thresholds to New York City,111
although the protections range from governing single-unit buildings in
parts of New Jersey112 to applying only to buildings with 100 or more
units in parts of New York.113 One of the states in the defined New
York metropolitan region, Connecticut, currently prohibits local
jurisdictions from adopting rent control laws.114

ii. Federal Subsidy Programs
Federal subsidy programs, including public housing and Housing
Choice Vouchers, also known as Section 8 vouchers, provide for a
significant amount of housing in the region, including over 350,000
units in New York City.115 However, these programs do not
necessarily prevent displacement. Holders of Section 8 vouchers

110. NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, supra note 91.
111. N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, DEREGULATION RENT AND INCOME
THRESHOLDS
(2018),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.p
df [https://perma.cc/98UM-XKRH].
112. See generally N.J. DEP’T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 2009 RENT CONTROL
SURVEY
(2009),
https://www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9EY-K268]. See, e.g., BOROUGH OF CHESILHURST, N.J. § 373.2
(1989); TOWNSHIP OF EAST BRUNSWICK, N.J. § 169-1 (2005); BOROUGH OF FAIR
LAWN, N.J. § 177-2 (1982); Landlord-Tenant Affairs, CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.,
http://cityofatlanticcity.org/?page_id=712
[https://perma.cc/GW74-UQZ7]
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2019).
113. See Urgent Relief for the Homless Act : Hearing on H.R. 558 Before the

Subcomm. on Hous. & Community Development of the H. Comm. On Banking,
Finance & Urb. Affairs, 100th Cong. 36 (1987) (statement of Rep. Stewart B.

McKinney). For a list of the specific New York municipalities adopting this approach,
see N.Y. STATE CONSUMER PROT. BD., RENT SMART: A CONSUMER GUIDE TO
LEASING
AND
APARTMENT
OR
HOUSE,
http://www.metcouncilonhousing.org/sites/default/files/rent_smarts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZL7S-8G2B] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
114. JULIA SINGER BANSAL, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH,
STATES
AUTHORIZING
RENT
CONTROL
1
(2015),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdf/2015-R-0020.pdf [https://perma.cc/N69W-H9SW].
115. NYU FURMAN CTR., NYCHA’S OUTSIZED ROLE IN HOUSING NEW YORK’S
POOREST HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (2018), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYCHA_Brief_1217-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9U4-34AU].
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often face constrained housing choices,116 despite attempts by local,
state, and federal government to prevent discrimination.117
Public housing units that are government built-and-operated exist
in large numbers in the region. The New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA) provides an enormous share of the affordable
housing in the city. In 2018, some 174,000 public units housed
approximately 400,000 low-income New Yorkers — or, one in eleven
renters.118 This is far more than the number supported by low-income
housing tax credits, at approximately 116,000 units.119 Rents in public
housing units are far more affordable than in unregulated units:
average public housing rents were less than a third of average
unregulated rents in New York City in 2017.120
There was a shift in the 1960s and 70s from federal decisions to
build public housing to subsidizing developments by private
developers. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is a
subsidy to private developers for low-income families to live in the
private housing market.121 This is now the largest subsidy for the
production of rental housing in the United States, allocated in the
form of tax credits for low-income housing.122

iii. New York City Programs
New York City has run dozens of subsidy programs within the five
boroughs over the decades.123 These often involve state, federal, or
local funding (or a combination thereof), subsidizing new
construction as well as the preservation of affordability in current
units.124 Programs like 421-a, for example, involve tax incentives to

116. Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act’s New
Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996).
117. See generally Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source of Income
Discrimination, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1407, 1407–08 (2010); Derek Waller, Note, Leveraging State and Local
Antidiscrimination Laws to Prohibit Discrimination Against Recipients of Federal
Rental Assistance, 27 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 401, 406–15

(2018).
118. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 115, at 1.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Robert Collinson et al., Low-Income Housing Policy 8–10 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21071, 2015).
122. Id. at 8.
123. Directory of NYC Housing Programs, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE
DATA.NYC, http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/all [https://perma.cc/QKS97F37] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
124. See id.
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provide affordability for certain units.125 Others, like J-51, provide
tax incentives for building renovation and refurbishment programs
that involve affordability protections.126 Land use tools have been
used as well, including Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, requiring
set-asides of affordable units in higher-density developments and
conversions.127 The City has also been using city-owned lots in
combination with federal programs to incentivize affordable
housing.128 Together these provide a significant share of subsidized
units within the five boroughs, and have recently had a renewed
emphasis under “Housing New York,” the 2014 plan to increase
housing affordability in the city.129 Housing New York financed just
over 135,000 units of new construction and affordability preservation
in its first five years.130
Most frequently, units subsidized through New York City programs
fall under rent stabilization.131 Subsidized new construction units are
initially leased through a lottery system, and applications require
proof of meeting low- or middle-income cutoffs.132 These subsidized
units are subject to the same vacancy bonus increases and high-rent
vacancy decontrol policies as all rent-stabilized units.

125. 421-a Tax Incentive Program, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE DATA.NYC,
http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/421-a-tax-incentive
[https://perma.cc/9PHV-5DC4] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
126. J-51 Tax Incentive, NYU FURMAN CTR.: CORE DATA.NYC,
http://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/j-51-tax-incentive
[https://perma.cc/GXD7-G24W] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
127. See Zoning Districts & Tools: Inclusionary Housing – DCP, NYC PLANNING,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/districts-tools/inclusionary-housing.page
[https://perma.cc/ZZT6-NHRG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Of note, many other
municipalities in the region also have inclusionary policies, most notably New Jersey
via the Mt. Laurel decision. See Mount Laurel Doctrine, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CTR.,
http://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/USW5-P9CW]
(last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
128. See, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TENPLAN
41
(2014),
YEAR
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/housing/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9U9-23NA].
129. See generally id.
130. Housing
New
York,
NYC
HOUSING,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/housing/index.page [https://perma.cc/87MC-SH47] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2019).
131. See Directory of NYC Housing Programs, supra note 123.
132. See Find Affordable Housing Opportunities, NYC HOUSING PRESERVATION
&
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/find-housing.page
[https://perma.cc/HA43-R25T] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019); Do You Qualify?, NYC
HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/do-youqualify.page [https://perma.cc/PT82-Z3EL] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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These programs are confined to the five boroughs of New York
City. Other jurisdictions have affordable housing programs but they
are at a smaller scale, without New York City’s substantial funding or
administrative capacity.133 Affordable housing is very expensive to
build and maintain, especially in areas with high land costs.134
Promisingly, New York State recently launched a plan to create and
preserve affordable housing in New York City and throughout the
state.135
C. Open-Market Rentals
The majority of rental units in the New York metropolitan region
are not governed by any form of affordability protections. Our
conservative estimates are that 2.3 million units are not governed by
some form of affordability protection.136

133. See, e.g., Affordable Housing, CITY OF JERSEY CITY, N.J.,
https://www.jerseycitynj.gov/cms/one.aspx?pageId=12682850
[https://perma.cc/8KXQ-VUHE] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
134. CAROLINA REID & HAYLEY RAETZ, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION,
PERSPECTIVES: PRACTITIONERS WEIGH IN ON DRIVERS OF RISING HOUSING
CONSTRUCTION
COSTS
IN
SAN
FRANCISCO
(2018),
https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/San_Francisco_Construction_Cost_Brief__Terner_Center_January_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST9J-BLUQ].
135. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, “Governor Cuomo Launches
Landmark $20 Billion Plan to Combat Homelessness and Create Affordable Housing
for All New Yorkers” (May 18, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-launches-landmark-20-billion-plan-combat-homelessness-and-createaffordable [https://perma.cc/GPK2-Y8SW].
136. This value was calculated by subtracting the number of rent stabilized and
rent controlled units in New York City and the approximate number of units under
rental protections in the rest of the New York metropolitan region from the total
number of rental units in the New York metropolitan region. The value for the
number of rent stabilized and rent controlled units in New York City was from the
2011 Furman Center Report on the Housing and Vacancy Survey. See NYU FURMAN
CTR., PROFILE OF RENT-STABILIZED UNITS AND TENANTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2014)
[hereinafter
FURMAN
CTR.,
2011
SURVEY],
https://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenter_FactBrief_RentStabilization_June2014.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZJD-CT63]. The estimated number of units under rental
protections in the rest of the New York metropolitan region was calculated as the
total number of units in municipalities with some form of rent stabilization measures.
Municipalities were listed in Jim Lapides et al., Rent Control Laws by State Chart
(2019). See Jim Lapides et al., Rent Control Laws by State Chart, NAT’L
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nmhc.org/researchinsight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/4SR8VE22]. Rental unit numbers were from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2012–2016
American Community Survey 5-year estimates (2017)., U.S. Census Bureau 2012–
2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates [hereinafter Census 2012–2016
5-Year
Estimates]
,
SOC.
EXPLORER,
https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2016_5yr (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
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Some of the rents in open-market units are affordable to
households, at less than 30% of their household incomes, and may be
below market rate. However, tenants have no protections against
rapid rent increases by landlords, making them particularly
vulnerable to displacement. Stabilized units have lower rents overall
than those on the open market in New York City.137
D. Third Way Tenures
“Third way” tenures refer to joint forms of ownership among
residents, such as community land trusts.138 The majority of New
York City’s subsidized housing programs are for renters, but the city
also has two subsidized housing programs which offer
homeownership at reduced rates — Mitchell Lama co-ops and
Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDFC) co-ops.139 Both of
these programs have income limits.140 Mitchell Lama units, created
out of a city-state program, have long multi-year waiting lists, with
many waiting lists within the New York metropolitan region closed.141
New York State has about 35 of these developments beyond New
York City limits but the majority are within the five boroughs.142
Some Mitchell Lamas are rentals, though most are cooperative
ownership.143 Data on third way tenures is not systematically
gathered on a national level, but the New York City Housing and

137. FURMAN CTR., 2011 SURVEY, supra note 136.
138. CHARLES GEISLER & GAIL DANEKER, PROPERTY AND VALUES:
ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP xiv (2000) (defining traditional
“third sector” or “third way” housing as common property regimes, including
cooperatives and community land trusts).
139. See
Mitchell-Lama,
NYC
HOUSING
PRESERVATION
&
DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/mitchell-lama.page
[https://perma.cc/GP8VKJ3U] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); HDFC Cooperatives, NYC HOUSING
PRESERVATION & DEV. https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/homeowner-hdfc.page
[https://perma.cc/8NX5-HMYU] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
140. Fact Sheet for Cooperative HDFC Shareholders, CITY OF NEW YORK,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/Owners/hdfc-coop-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FFY-42UY] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019); Mitchell Lama Applicant
Information, N.Y. HOMES & COMMUNITY RENEWAL, https://hcr.ny.gov/mitchelllama-applicant-information [https://perma.cc/7HG9-RS6P] (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. See
CITY
OF
NEW
YORK,
MITCHELL-LAMA
LISTING,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/renters-mitchell-lama/MLLIST.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3S6X-VFKZ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
143. See id.
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Vacancy Survey reports that there were approximately 300,000 units
of co-op housing in New York City in 2017.144
E. Mixed-Tenure
Mixed-tenure solutions include all forms of tenure that involve a
mixture of renting and owning on the same property, and therefore
provide a different balance of protection depending on the resident in
question. For example, a renter in an owner-occupied building may
not have as much stability or protection from increases in housing
costs as the homeowner, despite living on the same premises.
Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) — additional smaller houses on
the same property as another residential building, often with mixed
tenureship on the land parcel — have been slow to be legalized in the
New York metropolitan region.145
New York State allows
municipalities to form their own laws around the matter.146
Researchers in Long Island found that about 2% of single-family
homes, or about 16,000 units, have a legal ADU.147
F. Homeownership
Finally, over one-half of units in the New York metropolitan region
are owned rather than rented (53%).148 This percentage has increased
slightly over time: 51% of units were owned in 1990, and 53% were in
This categorization includes a range of types and
2016.149
characteristics, from single-family detached houses to condominiums
in multi-story buildings.150 In the New York metropolitan region, the
vast majority of owner-occupied units are single-family homes
144. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2018 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT 4 (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/18HSR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/645V-VUN5].
145. See VICKI BEEN ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., RESPONDING TO CHANGING
HOUSEHOLDS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES FOR MICRO-UNITS AND ACCESSORY
DWELLING UNITS 34–36 (2014); KAREN CHAPPLE ET AL., JUMPSTARTING THE
MARKET FOR ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM PORTLAND,
SEATTLE AND VANCOUVER 4 (2017);
146. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. § 3 (1983).
147. See CHRISTOPHER NIEDT & KATRIN B. ANACKER, HOFSTRA UNIV.,
ACCESSORY DWELLINGS ON LONG ISLAND: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2016),
https://issuu.com/hofstra/docs/adu_report_posted [https://perma.cc/W3V9-QGUE].
148. Census 2012–2016 5-Year Estimates, supra note 136.
149. Id.; U.S. Census Bureau 1990 Decennial Census [hereinafter 1990 Census],
SOC. EXPLORER, https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/RC1990 (last visited Oct. 18,
2019). Note: this statistic refers to the total percent of residents in the region owning
or renting at each time period.
150. 1990 Census, supra note 149; Census 2012–2016 5-Year Estimates
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(78%).151 While data on condominiums is not readily available for the
entire New York metropolitan region, in New York City there were
approximately 116,000 owner-occupied condominiums compared to
about 600,000 owner-occupied conventional homes.152
Owner-occupied units do not guarantee stability: the 2008 housing
crisis resulted in four million foreclosures across the United States
from 2008–2011.153 Homeownership is particularly risky for lowincome homeowners. Several studies show that nearly half of lowincome homebuyers return to renting within five years of purchasing
a home.154
Despite the risks, homeownership is still associated with more
stability than renting market-rate units is.155 Tax and fiscal policy
prioritize the stability of homeowners, through tax deductions on
retirement accounts and home mortgage interest, without equivalent
protections for lower-income renters.156 Ultimately, scholars have
described this as the “hidden welfare state.”157
PART III: NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES AND WHERE LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS LIVE
Determining the relationship between neighborhood change and
rent stabilization ordinances requires multiple steps of data
preparation. For this analysis, this Article used the 31-county New
York metropolitan region as defined by the Regional Plan
Association, extending across three states: New York, Connecticut,

151. Analysis from ACS 2017 data: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American
Community Survey 5-year Estimates, SOC. EXPLORER (2018) [hereinafter Census
20132017 5-Year Estimates], https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2017_5yr.
152. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., supra note 144, at 4. Questions about co-

ops and condominiums were not asked on the 2017 U.S. Census American
Community Survey.
153. WILLIAM M. ROHE & MARK LINDBLAD, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES,
HARVARD UNIV., REEXAMINING THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AFTER
THE HOUSING CRISIS 2 (2013).
154. See THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLOTTMAN, WEALTH ACCUMULATION
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 33 (2004); C.E.
Herbert & E.S. Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of Low-Income and
Minority Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, 10 CITYSCAPE 2, 18
(2008); Carolina Katz Reid, Achieving the American Dream? A Longitudinal
Analysis of the Homeowner Experiences of Low-Income Households 19 (Ctr. for
Soc. Dev., Working Paper 05-20, 2005).
155. Rohe & Lindblad, supra note 153, at 44.
156. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 17–18, 28 (1999).
157. See id. at 17–18.
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and New Jersey.158 Part III first describes this data preparation
process and then presents the results of the analysis: a typology of
eight different forms of neighborhood change.
A. Data and Methods
The first step in the analysis is designating neighborhoods by their
stage of change over time. For this, data from the Decennial Census,
collected in 1990 and 2000, and the American Community Survey
from 2012 to 2016 was used.159 To reconcile the changes in tract
boundaries from earlier time periods, this Article used Brown
University’s Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB) and its crosswalks,
which normalize census tract data from each year to 2010 census tract
boundaries to maximize comparability across the study period.160
Where variables are not provided by the LTDB,161 the original raw
data was downloaded and normalized using LTDB’s crosswalk.
Change in both low- and high-income neighborhoods was
characterized — looking at gentrification and displacement in the
former and exclusion in the latter. Thus, the region was divided into
low-income neighborhoods at less than 80% of area regional median
household income, and moderate- to high-income neighborhoods
with median income at or above 80% of area regional median
household income. These thresholds were selected to be consistent
with affordable housing policies and programs.162 Tracts with
populations of over 500 were also selected, primarily because of data
reliability issues.
To describe the neighborhoods where gentrification and
displacement are taking place, most studies first pinpoint the

158. See Where We Work, REGIONAL PLAN. ASS’N, http://www.rpa.org
[https://perma.cc/GNM8-DB2H] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
159. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DECENNIAL CENSUS (1990, 2000); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2012-2016).
160. See John R. Logan et al., Interpolating U.S. Decennial Census Tract Data
from as Early as 1970 to 2010: A Longitudinal Tract Database, 66 PROF.
GEOGRAPHER 412, 417 (2014).
161. The variables missing from the LTDB included household income distribution
and number of low-income households moving into a census tract. These were
downloaded instead via Social Explorer, http://www.socialexplorer.com.
162. HUD has established income limits to determine the income eligibility of
applicants for subsidized housing subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(2)(a) (2016); Income
Limits, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING. & URBAN DEV. OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES.,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html#2016 [https://perma.cc/P25Q-3CW7]
(last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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neighborhoods with potential to change (or the “eligible” tracts).163
To do this here, several different indicators were used. At the most
basic level, vulnerability to change is defined by concentration of
affordable housing,164 so neighborhoods where either rents or housing
values are below the regional median were selected. Also selected
were several other demographic characteristics — college education
below the regional median, share of low-income households above
the regional median, share of renters above the regional median, and
share of nonwhite households above the regional median. The results
of this study suggested that “eligible” neighborhoods must have
housing affordability plus any three of the four demographic
characteristics.
Next, neighborhood change was characterized in the form of
gentrification, operationalized as the influx of investment and people
into low-income areas, and displacement, the loss of low-income
households without replacement, in low-income areas. Exclusion, by
this Article’s definition, transpires when displacement occurs in highincome neighborhoods. Thus, gentrification was measured via the
change in real median housing value or rent — depending on whether
the neighborhood is majority owner or renter — above the regional
median change, as well as growth in share of college educated
population and household median income greater than the regional
median change. To measure displacement and exclusion, two
indicators were used: absolute loss of low-income households
between census years and decrease in the in-migration rate of lowincome households.
Finally, two additional neighborhood types were created. For a set
of neighborhoods that have not yet gentrified but also exhibit both
vulnerability and a real estate market that is heating up, we use the
designation “at risk of gentrification.” For all neighborhoods,
whether gentrifying or exclusionary, where the median income is
more than two times the regional median of $70,000, a category
“super gentrification or exclusion” was created.

163. See KAREN CHAPPLE ET AL., U.C. BERKELEY & UCLA, DEVELOPING A NEW
METHODOLOGY
FOR
ANALYZING
DISPLACEMENT
66
(2017),
https://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/arb_tod_report_13310.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH6S-ATHD].
164. See Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City
Movement by Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 538, 545 (1979)
(characterizing this as the rent gap, or the difference between a housing unit’s current
rent and the potential rental income under market conditions). A simple proxy,
whether a census tract’s median home value or rent is less than 80% of the regional
median, was used to identify this affordable housing stock.
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B. Results
Table 2 explains the classification system. Figures 1 and 2 map the
results of this analysis and describe change over time at the
neighborhood level.165 The maps identify historic change and predict
areas likely to change in the future. Overall, of the 5294 census tracts
in the 31-county region, 7% have already gentrified, 5% are currently
undergoing gentrification, 9% are currently undergoing displacement,
14% are in some stage of exclusion, 6% are in super gentrification or
exclusion, and 10% are at risk of gentrification. The remaining 48%
of tracts may be considered stable.
This typology depicts
neighborhood change over a 26-year period and uses the patterns
from 1990 to 2016 to predict long-term change.

165. Analysis by the authors is based on the New York dataset. See Miriam Zuk &
Karen Chapple, Mapping Displacement and Gentrification in the New York
Metropolitan Area, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT (July 27, 2019) [hereinafter
Chapple,
Mapping
NY],
https://www.urbandisplacement.org/maps/ny
[https://perma.cc/XZG9-QQPG]; Region defined as 31-county New York
metropolitan region. Categorization of Income Levels (in terms of Area Median
Income): Low Income = Below 80%, Moderate to High Income = 80–199%, Very
High Income = 200% or Higher. See infra Appendix 1.
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Table 2. Neighborhood Change Typologies for the New York
Metropolitan Region
Displacement and Gentrification Census Tract Typologies
Typology (tract income level)

Typology Criteria

Not Losing Low-Income
Households (Low Income)





Population in 2000 >500
Low Income Tract in 2016
Not classified as At Risk or Ongoing Gentrification or
Displacement

At Risk of Gentrification
(Low Income)







Population in 2016 > 500
Low Income Tract in 2016
Vulnerable in 2016 (Defined in Appendix)
“Hot market” from 2000 to 2016
Not currently undergoing displacement or ongoing
gentrification

Ongoing
Displacement of
Low-Income
Households (Low
Income)

Ongoing Gentrification
(Low Income)





Population in 2000 > 500
Low Income Tract in 2016
Loss of Low-Income households 2000-2016 (absolute
loss)



Few signs of gentrification occurring





Population in 2000 or 2016 > 500
Low Income Tract in 2016
Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2016 (Defined in
Appendix)

Advanced Gentrification
(Moderate to High Income)





Population in 2000 or 2016 > 500
Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016
Gentrified in 1990-2000 or 2000-2016 (Defined in
Appendix)

Stable Exclusion
(Moderate to High Income)





Population in 2000 > 500
Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016
Not classified as Ongoing Exclusion
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Table 2 (Continued)

Ongoing Exclusion
(Moderate to High
Income)





Population in 2000 > 500



LI migration rate (percent of all migration to tract that

Moderate to High Income Tract in 2016
Loss of Low-Income (“LI”) households 2000-2016
(absolute loss)
was LI) in 2016 < in 2009

Super Gentrification or
Exclusion
(Very High Income)




Population in 2000 > 500
Median household income > 200% of regional
median in 2016

Figure 1: Map of Typologies in the New York Metropolitan Region166

166. Based on analysis by the authors from the New York dataset. See id; infra
Appendix 1.
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Figure 2: Typologies in Manhattan and Brooklyn167

167. Based on analysis by the authors from the New York dataset. See Chapple,
Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra Appendix 1.
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Overall, low-income households are dispersed throughout the
different types (Figure 3).168 Less than half live in low-income
neighborhoods, indicating that there is considerable neighborhood
income diversity in the region.
Figure 3: Location of Low-Income Households by Neighborhood
Type169

PART IV: THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF RENT STABILIZATION
This Part describes the way rent stabilization may work in different
neighborhood contexts in the New York metropolitan region. First, it
summarizes the results of the study and identifies the number of units
affected under potential rent stabilization measures and the change in
rent and ownership across neighborhood types. This Part then
analyzes the role rent stabilization could play in each neighborhood
type and in parts of the New York metropolitan region not currently
covered by affordability protections. It argues that rent stabilization

168. Created by the authors based
Displacement New York dataset. See
Appendix 1.
169. Created by the authors based
Displacement New York dataset. See
Appendix 1.

upon the typology analysis, using the Urban
Chapple, Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra
upon the typology analysis, using the Urban
Chapple, Mapping NY., supra note 165; infra
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can play multiple roles: to prevent losing low-income households,
address ongoing displacement, and slow gentrification in certain atrisk neighborhoods. Finally, it discusses different factors that
policymakers should consider in a rent stabilization scheme.
Rent stabilization is the primary tool available to increase renter
stability and provide affordability protections.170 There is evidence
that rent stabilization increases housing stability and decreases
resident mobility, especially displacement due to external forces (such
as increased rents) rather than choice.171 These impacts are seen in
both rent stabilized units and in those units on the open market, not
covered by renter protections.172
Housing stability has long been a priority of the U.S. government,
ever since policy measures were enacted in response to post-Great
Depression homelessness and foreclosures.173 Though other methods
of keeping low-income residents in their homes exist, rent
stabilization holds the greatest promise for broad implementation.
For example, the number of residents on the waiting list for Section 8
vouchers in Los Angeles is over nine times the number of existing
vouchers.174 The expansion of Section 8 vouchers would be very
costly: the budget of the program was $22 billion for 2018, and an
expansion of the program to 55,000 new targeted households is
costing $450 million in 2019.175 Additionally, even a small increase in
program size required pushing back against the current federal
administration, and ultimately, research has found that the Section 8
program does not materially improve housing conditions for most

170. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 21.
171. See Richard W. Ault et al., The Effect of Long-Term Rent Control on Tenant
Mobility, 35 J. URB. ECON. 140, 157 (1994); Joseph Gyourko & Peter Linneman,

Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical Study of New York
City, 26 J. URB. ECON. 54, 73–74 (1989); Jakob Munch & Michael Svarer, Rent
Control and Tenancy Duration, 52 J. URB. ECON. 542, 557 (2002); Peter Dreier, A Fix
for LA’s Housing Crisis: Repeal the Ellis Act, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2017, 5:06

PM)
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-fix-for-las-housing-crisis-repeal-the-ellisact_b_597a3ccae4b06b305561cef4 [https://perma.cc/3T8Y-R8S3]; Clark & Heskin,
supra note 64, at 116; Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 2; PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1,
at 4.
172. See Pastor et al., supra note 1, at 4.
173. See id. at 17.
174. See id. at 20.
175. Alison Bell & Douglas Rice, Congress Prioritizes Housing Programs in 2018
Funding Bill, Rejects Trump Administration Proposals, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (July 19, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/congressprioritizes-housing-programs-in-2018-funding-bill-rejects-trump
[https://perma.cc/M3W9-E7K].
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residents.176 In contrast, rent stabilization can be implemented at
scale. New York City’s rent regulation program demonstrates this,
and it also illustrates methods to strengthen tenant protections and
stability under rent stabilization.177 Rent stabilization exists in all five
boroughs of the city, but significant portions of the region are
unprotected or are covered under specific forms of rent stabilization
restricted to limited unit types.178
Rent stabilization has been found to have an impact on the portion
of homes rented or owned, increasing the portion of homes owned
instead of rented: a reduction in rents received means that some
landlords take rental units off of the rental market.179 Landlords may
elect to evict tenants so that they can move into their own units (often
allowed under owner move-in eviction laws);180 or so owners can
convert rental units to condominiums. In conjunction with how rent
stabilization has been shown to shift tenure to ownership,181 rent
regulation decontrol tends to shift tenure back to rental.182 The
change in rental tenure is not insignificant. A study of San Francisco
estimated that rental stock decreased by 15% due to rent stabilization
over the 1979–1994 time period.183
The following analysis provides an approximation of the number of
units that could potentially preserve affordability under rent
stabilization across different neighborhood types. The neighborhood
change typologies provide a framework to analyze the differing
potential benefits or drawbacks of rent stabilization depending on
neighborhood context. For example, rent stabilization would play a
vital role in maintaining affordability in some areas, and likely would
reinforce the status quo in others.

176. Id. See generally William G. Grigsby & Steven C. Bourassa, Section 8: The
Time for Fundamental Program Change?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 805, 805

(2004).
177. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION
AND RENT CONTROL 1 (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/factsheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM].
178. Lapides et al., supra note 136.
179. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 30.
180. Elizabeth Naughton, Comment, San Francisco’s Owner Move-In Legislation:
Rent Control or Out of Control?, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 537, 537–39 (1999).
181. See Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 44; see also Allan D. Heskin et al., The
Effects of Vacancy Control, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 162, 162 (2000); Daniel K. Fetter,

The Home Front: Rent Control and the Rapid Wartime Increase in Home
Ownership 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19604, 2013); PASTOR
ET AL., supra note 1, at 21.
182. Sims, supra note 65, at 145.
183. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1.
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This exploratory analysis of the number of units eligible for rent
stabilization was estimated based on Census data, using three criteria
employed in the majority of rent stabilization measures in the region,
including those in New York City. These criteria were approximated
using available Census cutoffs: buildings built before 1979, with five
or more units, and rents below $2750.184 The number of eligible units
for each tract was calculated by using the percent of rental units in
each tract qualifying under the three specifications, along with the
total number of rental units in each tract. The approximation of
falling under rent stabilization measures using Census data is
assuming independence between building age and size and falling
under the high-rent vacancy decontrol threshold. This number is
approximate, as the Census questions are asked separately, and the
percent of units under the decontrol threshold is assuming an even
distribution of units in the appropriate Census gross rent category.185
It is likely that having a unit’s rent above the decontrol threshold of
$2750 may be related to building size and age, though these variables
had a low correlation.186
Table 3 shows the total estimated number of units that would be
eligible for rent stabilization within each New York regional
neighborhood change typology using the rent stabilization eligibility
criteria.187 The results are shown in the first column of Table 3.
Table 3 also includes a measure of the approximate number of units
affordable to the median regional household income, calculated as
having rents less than 30% of the regional median monthly income
($1500).188 This measure describes the total number of rental units
under the $1500 threshold, irrespective of building age and size.
Finally, the third column describes the approximate number of units
eligible for rent stabilization, using the above qualifications, that are
also under the $1500 rent threshold. The table demonstrates the large
number of units in the region that would be eligible for rent
stabilization policies, as they now stand, as well as the approximate
number of potential affordable units eligible for such policies. The

184. Naughton, supra note 180.
185. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data. Infra Appendix 1.
186. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census data. Infra Appendix 1. Correlation between
percent of units above the $2750 threshold and units in buildings of 5 or more units
built before 1979 is -0.0760.
187. Census tract-level estimates were summed by neighborhood type to determine
these totals.
188. This is an approximation that does not take into account individual household
incomes related to their rental costs.
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patterns across different neighborhood types are described in
individual sections below.
Table 3: Rental Units Affected Under Potential Rent Stabilization
Measures
Affordable to
median
regional

Affordable to median
regional income and
eligible for current

rent stabilization)

income190

rent stabilization191

Not losing lowincome households

194,100

272,100

136,100

Ongoing
displacement

248,700

306,300

189,900

At risk of
gentrification

365,200

484,500

309,100

Ongoing or
advanced
gentrification
Stable or ongoing
exclusion

262,000

331,300

194,400

154,400

173,500

79,200

Super gentrification
or exclusion

17,000

17,100

6400

Neighborhood type

Total units
potentially preserved
(eligible for current
189

As shown below in Table 4, there have been changes in tenure type
across the region between 1990 and 2016. The percent of renters
increased by 2% in areas not losing low-income households, by 1% in
areas with ongoing displacement, and by 4% in areas at risk of
gentrification. The percent of renters decreased by 2.5% in areas
facing stable or ongoing exclusion, and by 9% in those with super
gentrification or exclusion.
Table 4 also shows the diversity in the proportion of households in
a tract that rent their homes, ranging from 79% of tracts at risk of
gentrification to only 8% of super gentrification or exclusion tracts.
These indicate the broad range of percent owner or renter across
typologies, and the differing impacts that rent stabilization measures
would have.

189. Approximation using the percent of buildings of 5+ units, built before 1979 in
each Census Tract, under $2750 rent decontrol limit.
190. Under 30% of median regional monthly income: $1500.
191. Rent under $1500, total number of units in type eligible for rent stabilization.
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Table 4: Change in Rent/Ownership Across Neighborhood Types
Percent
renter 2016

Percent change
(percent renter) 19902016

Change in percent
renters/percent owners,
1990-2016

Not losing lowincome
households

0.687

0.024

0.071

Ongoing
displacement

0.752

0.014

0.144

At risk of
gentrification

0.785

0.041

0.409

Ongoing or
advanced
gentrification

0.564

-0.009

-0.011

Stable or
ongoing
exclusion

0.363

-0.026

-0.022

Super
gentrification or
exclusion

0.086

-0.088

-0.014

This Part uses the typologies to conduct an exploratory analysis of
the role that rent regulation could play in each neighborhood type
and in parts of the region not covered by affordability protections.
Rent stabilization offers the primary way to keep people in their
homes, providing essential stability, in terms of tenure, in areas prone
to displacement, as well as income diversity in exclusive areas.192
A. Not Losing Low-Income Households
As described in Part II.B, areas that are not losing low-income
households are classified as low-income in 2016 and do not have
gentrification or displacement risk factors.193 These areas contain a
192. See Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1 (demonstrating stability). See generally
NYU FURMAN CTR., RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2012)
http://furmancenter.org/files/HVS_Rent_Stabilization_fact_sheet_FINAL_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L52G-W8UK] (demonstrating income diversity).
193. See supra Part II.
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significant number of units that would qualify for protection under
rent stabilization laws.194 These may not be areas with the most
opportunity or greatest immediacy to protect renters, but the 272,000
units that are affordable to the regional median income serve an
important purpose in housing residents in a region facing such high
housing costs.195 Rent stabilization measures would protect half of
these units, and research indicates that rent stabilization would not
have a detrimental impact on house values or future construction.196
B. Ongoing Displacement
Areas facing the ongoing displacement of low-income households
were low-income census tracts in 2016, which have been seeing a
decline of low-income households but face few signs of
gentrification.197 Similar to areas not losing low-income households,
these are areas that contain a significant portion of the New York
metropolitan region’s rental units affordable to the regional median
income. 75% of residents in ongoing displacement tracts are
renters.198 And given the rise in rents across the region, ensuring
stability in areas with a significant share of renters is vital. As noted
above, several studies have shown that new housing supply is not
affected by rent stabilization measures, but instead is impacted by the
local economy and other conditions.199
C. At Risk of Gentrification
Census tracts at risk of gentrification contain the largest number of
rental units affordable to the regional median income.
Approximately 300,000 of these units would qualify for rent
stabilization protections due to building type and age.200 These areas
were low-income in 2016 and were classified as “hot market” from
Each tract also meets three of four other
2000 to 2016.201
194. See supra Table 3.
195. See supra Table 3.
196. See Gilderbloom & Ye, supra note 69, at 214; Sims, supra note 65, at 1. See
generally Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP.
99 (1995); John Ingram Gilderbloom, Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the
Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock, 17 URB. AFF. Q. 123 (1981).
197. See supra Table 2.
198. Measured by the authors based upon the typology analysis, using the Urban
Displacement New York dataset. See URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, supra note 165.
199. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1 at 16; Gilderbloom, supra note 196, at 123;
Gilderbloom & Ye, supra note 69, at 214; Sims, supra note 65, at 130.
200. See supra Table 3.
201. See supra Table 2.
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qualifications: higher than median percent low-income households,
percent college educated, percent renters, or percent nonwhite.202
Overall, these tracts are 79% renter households.203
These areas at risk of gentrification are primary locations that
would benefit from rent stabilization measures, providing renter
households with stability protections.
D. Ongoing or Advanced Gentrification
Historically, there has been considerable disagreement about
which neighborhoods are considered to be gentrifying.204 The
neighborhood typologies allow insight into where these areas are, at
the forefront of displacement, and the loss of low-income households
in the region.
Renters in areas with ongoing and advanced gentrification are
currently facing significant displacement pressures, with rising or
raised rents and demographic changes in the neighborhood.205 These
areas are therefore primary cases of the need for rent regulation to
increase stability and allow remaining residents to stay in their homes.
New, wealthy residents bring an inflow of capital into neighborhoods,
but strategies like rent stabilization are needed to ensure that older
residents are able to capture the benefits of new resources.206
One recent study in San Francisco suggested rent regulation may
fuel gentrification, because of a reduction in rental stock due to
conversions to owner-occupancy,207 though other scholars have since
argued that the study did not sufficiently account for the other
pressures increasing rents in the area.208 Others have found no
evidence of gentrification, and that rent stabilized buildings drive
down surrounding rents.209
E. Stable or Ongoing Exclusion
The number of eligible rental units in exclusive neighborhoods is
far fewer than that in the other neighborhood types, with
approximately 173,000 units affordable to the median household

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See id.
See supra Table 4.
See generally LORETTA LEES ET AL., GENTRIFICATION 4 (2008).
See supra Table 2.
See generally CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 130–31.
See Naughton, supra note 180, at 537–41.
PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 12.
See Heskin et al., supra note 181, at 172; Sims, supra note 65, at 130.
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income and 79,000 affordable units in eligible buildings.210 But these
are some of the most important units to protect affordability in, for
the sake of income diversity and opportunity, including allowing less
wealthy residents to access benefits of income mixing and higher local
investment in schools, parks, and other neighborhood amenities.211
Rent stabilization and renter protections may be the best way to
protect the presence of low-income neighbors in these areas, as rents
and home values are very high, and federal programs seem to offer
little access to wealthy neighborhoods for low-income households.212
F. Super-Gentrification or Exclusion
Areas that have gone through super-gentrification or exclusion
have seen immense changes, with median household incomes over
200% of the regional median in 2016 along with gentrification or
exclusion indicators.213 As a result, there are few remaining
affordable units in these areas.214 The percent of rental households
decreased 8.8% from 1990–2016, and only 8.6% of units in these areas
are renter-occupied.215 Meanwhile, only 6300 units are in eligible
buildings with rents affordable to the regional median household
income.216 Tenants would benefit from the distributional impacts of
rent regulation; rent control measures have not been shown to
decrease the supply of new construction.217

210. See supra Table 3.
211. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
212. See generally Jake Wegmann & Karen Christensen, Subsidized Rental
Housing in the United States, 17 PLAN. F. 55, 64 (2016) (describing lack of access to
opportunity); Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 1 (demonstrating stability).
213. See supra Table 2.
214. See supra Table 3.
215. See supra Table 4.
216. See supra Table 3.
217. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 1, at 15. In areas with significant majority-owner
households, it is worth noting the significant subsidies to homeowners. United States
homeowners receive federal mortgage subsidies, in far greater amounts than that
spent on rental subsidies — over two-thirds of the federal government’s spending on
housing subsidizes homeowners. See Anthony Downs, Introduction: Why Rental
Housing is the Neglected Child of American Shelter, in REVISITING RENTAL
HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND PRIORITIES 7–8 (N. P. Retsinas & E. S. Belsky
eds., 2008); Collinson et al., supra note 121, at 1
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G. Ways to Work with Rent Control: Tenant Protections, Decontrol
Thresholds
Rent stabilization measures have potential benefits across the
many typologies in the New York metropolitan region, but this is not
to say rent stabilization measures are perfect. Several strategies may
be able to increase the effectiveness of rent stabilization measures in
providing stability and affordable housing.

i. High-Rent Vacancy Decontrol
Currently, most rent stabilization regimes in the region include
three decontrol provisions, allowing rental increases upon tenants
vacating a unit, and allowing units to enter the open market after
rents pass a threshold and have a vacancy — currently approximately
$2770 — or when renters pass an income threshold and rents are at or
above the rent threshold.218 Over 160,000 units in New York City left
the stabilized housing stock from 1994–2018 due to high-rent vacancy
deregulation, which accounted for over half of the total losses of
stabilized housing units.219 This vacancy rent increase has led to
incentives for landlords to push out tenants, as it means they are able
to raise rents with each rental turnover, resulting in tenant
harassment and unstable tenures for tenants.220 Reducing these
incentives, by increasing or removing the high-rent vacancy decontrol
threshold or reducing vacancy bonus increases, may lead to more
stability for renters.

218. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2018),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A]; N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT
SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION AND RENT CONTROL 1
(2018),
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM].
219. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING
STOCK
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY
IN
2018
1,
7
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/changes19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TPJ-5ZP6].
220. Elvin Wyly et al., Displacing New York, 42 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2602, 2609
(2010).

1178

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

ii. Increased Tenant Protections
New York City recently rolled out a comprehensive tenant
protection program, beginning in 2017.221 The program provides free
legal services for tenants falling under 200% of the federal poverty
line, and includes access to legal services for tenants facing eviction in
housing court and anti-harassment and displacement legal services.222
In the first year of the service, close to 250,000 residents had made use
of the program, including approximately 26,000 households facing
eviction cases in Housing Court.223 This program is feasible due to
the capacity of related nonprofit organizations and legal services in
New York City. However, providing additional legal services in other
areas would strengthen the tenure benefits of rent stabilization
measures.

iii. Code Enforcement and Other
Regulations and enforcement may be able to reduce some of the
negative side effects that have come with rent stabilization. Studies
have shown that some of the affordability provided by rent stabilized
units may come at the cost of maintenance problems, likely due to a
lack of incentives on the part of landlords and underreporting by
tenants.224 Increased code enforcement may remedy this issue.225
An increase in condominium conversions often occurs due to rent
regulations.226 Unlike Mitchell-Lamas or HDFCs, these are marketrate condominiums, catering to higher-income residents.227 New
York City prevents the condominium conversion of rent stabilized
units: rent stabilized tenants are allowed to stay on in the building as
renters.228 Currently limited to New York City, this type of measure

221. OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES 1 (2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ-UA-2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSJ2-M5SJ].
222. Id. at 16.
223. Id. at 1.
224. See Nandinee K. Kutty, The Impact of Rent Control on Housing

Maintenance: A Dynamic Analysis Incorporating European and North American
Rent Regulations, 11 HOUSING STUD. 69, 83 (1996).
225. Id. at 69.
226. Diamond et al., supra note 4, at 5.
227. See id.
228. Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, Assembly Speaker, N.Y. State Assembly,
Assembly Passes Historic Affordable Housing Protections to Bring Stability to
Tenants
Across
New
York
State
(June
14,
2019),
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/files/20190614a.php [https://perma.cc/LZ95-J367].
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is helpful when thinking about potential expansions of rent
stabilization to the region, to reduce the likelihood of residents living
in affordability-protected units from being forced out.
CONCLUSION
By examining the potential extent of universal rent stabilization
across the New York metropolitan region, this study found that the
measure could keep rents affordable for over 800,000 families just in
these three types of areas: gentrifying, at risk, and exclusive. Just as
rent stabilization plays a role in preserving affordability for tenants, it
also acts to stabilize communities and preserve security of tenure.
These impacts of rent stabilization vary according to neighborhood
context. Rent stabilization could potentially play a particularly
effective role in gentrifying areas, by reducing rent increases; in areas
at risk of gentrification, by keeping rents low; and in exclusive areas,
by preserving access to resources and opportunity. Gentrifying, at
risk, and most notably exclusive areas are present not just in New
York City, but throughout the metropolitan region. It is important to
assess how rent stabilization could slow displacement in communities
throughout the 31 counties.
The expansion of rent regulation is not a far-fetched dream. In
February 2019, Oregon passed legislation establishing rent control for
the entire state.229 Moreover, in June 2019, New York State passed
legislation (S6458) to strengthen and expand rent regulation across
While this Article describes the state of rental
the state.230
protections in the New York metropolitan region prior to S6458, the
potential of the expansion of rent stabilization described in the
Article still holds. By increasing tenant protections and by allowing
all jurisdictions to opt into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act,
S6458 makes the expansion of rent stabilization in the New York
metropolitan region more feasible and impactful than before.
Rent stabilization is one of many possible tools to preserve
affordability and stabilize communities.
There are dozens of
mechanisms to protect individual tenants, preserve affordable units,
and plan for diversity over the long-term.231 Yet, few of these will act

229. S.B. 608, 80th Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019).
230. See supra note 1; see also Luis Ferré-Sadurní et al., Landmark Deal Reached
on Rent Protections for Tenants in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/nyregion/rent-protection-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/BJ6W-9J9J].
231. See generally Karen Chapple, A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Affordable
Housing Policy: Learning from Climate Change Policy, BERKELEY BLOG (February
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fast enough or at a large enough scale to preserve affordability, and
many will not work in the contexts where stabilization is most needed.
For instance, inclusionary housing ordinances take years to produce a
few units,232 and land costs make construction of new affordable units
very expensive in the core of strong market cities.233 Therefore, rent
stabilization deserves a closer look at how it can make and keep cities
and suburbs diverse and inclusive.

11, 2016), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2016/02/11/a-multi-dimensional-approach-toaffordable-housing-policy-learning-from-climate-change-policy/
[https://perma.cc/PN69-B5TT].
232. See CHAPPLE, supra note 21, at 82.
233. See REID & RAETZ, supra note 134, at 1.
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APPENDIX 1: TYPOLOGY METHODOLOGY

 Vulnerable to gentrification in 1990 or 2000
•

Housing affordable in base year (housing sales prices or
rent < 80% of median)
and (any 3 of 4)
• % low-income households > regional median
• % college educated < regional median
• % renters > regional median
• % nonwhite > regional median
 “Hot Market” in 2000 or 2016
• Change in median real rent > regional median
or
• Change in median value for owner-occupied homes >
regional median
 Gentrification from 1990 to 2000 or 2000 to 2016
• Vulnerable in base year (as defined above)
• Demographic change between base and end years:
• Difference in % college educated > regional
median
• Percent change in real median household income >
regional median
• “Hot market” (defined above)
 If any individual variable is missing, then the whole typology is
missing.
 Tracts with a coefficient of variation > 30% on several key 2016
variables are flagged and determined unreliable:
• Population
• Housing units
• Median rent
• Median home value
• Median income
• College count
• Renter count

